It seems plausible that the point of doing philosophy is to arrive at a rational consensus about the true answers to philosophical problems. But then it appears clear that doing philosophy is bound to be pointless because it will fail to produce such a consensus. A main reason for this is that philosophical problems often take the form of firmly entrenched commonsensical intuitions being opposed by powerful philosophical arguments. Examples are issues such as whether physical things, some of which have minds, exist independently of our perception, whether our inductive and memory beliefs are justifiable, whether we have free will and responsibility, whether we have reason to be especially concerned about ourselves, and whether there are moral norms that are objectively valid. This book suggests that what side we land on in such disputes is ultimately due to features of our personality. But if this is true, the point of philosophizing could be to work out a philosophy that articulates our personality. If our philosophy has a broad scope, it will enable a fuller articulation of our personality. Moreover, it is more likely to carry implications about how to live, which provides philosophizing with a further possible point. The author sketches how his personality has shaped his views on the issues mentioned and their implications for living.
Ingmar Persson is Emeritus Professor of Practical Philosophy at the University of Gothenburg, and Distinguished Research Fellow of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Oxford University. Among his publications are six books on Oxford University Press.